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ABSTRACT
Centralized systems in the Internet of Things—be it local
middleware or cloud-based services—fail to fundamentally
address privacy of the collected data. We propose an archi-
tecture featuring secure multiparty computation at its core in
order to realize data processing systems which already in-
corporate support for privacy protection in the architecture.
1. INTRODUCTION
Smart environments and smart buildings constitute a
vital part of the Internet of Things. In these contexts,
sensors are deployed to gather information about the
state of the real-world environment. This information,
in turn, represents the data foundation for services that
influence the environment state, provide insights for in-
habitants and interact with them. Examples for these
services are public displays, which give statistical infor-
mation about the building state, monitoring services for
maintenance personnel and anomaly detection systems
which detect incidents and failures.
These and many other services have in common that
they do not directly work on the raw data gathered by
the sensors. Instead, they use derived aggregated re-
sults by computational preprocessing: Public displays
show diagrams of statistical data, monitoring and anomaly
detection services work with events and alerts gained by
rules, machine learning or other types of computation.
For mediating the data flow between the sensor platforms—
the data sources—and the services—the data consumers—
typically a middleware is deployed. Its purpose encom-
passes collection and storage of raw data, analysis, pro-
cessing and finally forwarding the obtained results to
the data consuming services. This middleware can ei-
ther be a local part of the smart environment but can
also be provided as cloud service.
This type of architecture and the corresponding han-
dling of data has severe implications for the privacy of
the sensor data: 1) The middleware acts as a third
party which gains full access to raw data coming from
the sensors. This third party might not even be under
control of the administrators of the smart environment
and hence untrustworthy. 2) By pushing data to a third
party, sources lose insights into how their data is used
afterwards. Data processing becomes intransparent for
them. 3) Similarly, sources lose control over the usage
of their data. Especially, revocation of data requires
trust in the data holder to actually obey. 4) Even if
trustworthy, the third party is still a high value target
for attackers.
2. PRIVACY PRESERVING DATA PROCESS-
ING
Our vision is to realize the described functionality
while fundamentally providing privacy protection on the
architectural level. We propose that raw data created
by the distributed sources is not collected by a middle-
ware but remains distributed on these sources. This
allows secure computations and can make consent and
cooperation of the sources a necessity for the execution.
Our understanding of privacy and data protection is
based on [1,2]. They most importantly feature the pro-
tection goals of data minimization, unlinkability, trans-
parency, and intervenability. Against this background,
the positive implications of our approach are as follows:
The amount of data in the system is minimized since
there are no intermediaries which can also access data.
Logically, the derived results are directly transmitted
from the sources to the final consumers. The poten-
tial for data misuse and unauthorized recombination of
data is decreased since data of different sources is not
stored at the same logical place in a linkable fashion.
Specifically, only making allowed computations techni-
cally possible concomitantly realizes purpose binding.
The required cooperation of the data sources in turn
provides them with information about the ongoing com-
putations and the usage of their data. This constitutes
transparency, especially when this feedback is enhanced
with meta information about the final consumer. Per-
sisting these insights can additionally realize account-
ability. Lastly, given the cooperation requirement and
aforementioned transparency, they remain in control
since they can specifically decide beforehand whether
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to cooperate and to provide their data for the usage in
question or not.
3. ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
The provided vision satisfies several data protection
goals which are not yet fulfilled by state-of-the-art archi-
tectures. In order to realize this vision technically, the
following main challenge has to be addressed: It must be
possible to derive computation results from raw data of
different sources without sharing this data among them
nor handing it to a third party for computation.
For this purpose, secure multiparty computation (SMC)
[3–5] can be employed. Instead of local computations
of a third party a secure protocol among the sources
is executed [6, 7]. Afterwards each only knows its own
input and the final output of the computation. All ex-
changed intermediary data due to technical reasons does
not allow recovering other parties inputs. Mathemati-
cal foundations for realizing arbitrary functions as SMC
invocations are known since the 80’s [8, 9] but protocol
improvements for security and performance [10,11] and
new applications [12] are still current research.
For sucessfully applying SMC in smart environment
we propose the following architecture: The formerly
stated middleware is replaced by a gateway. The vi-
tal difference is that the gateway does not obtain ac-
cess to the raw data of the sources. Instead, facing
the sources it only fulfills management and orchestra-
tion purposes to carry out SMC computations. Towards
the consumers, it presents an API which abstracts from
SMC and resembles an interface a centralized middle-
ware would provide.
Robust automated execution of SMC [13].
The main purpose of the gateway is to handle SMC
sessions in cooperation with the sources. For this, the
gateway must be initially known by them. Similarly,
upon connection interruption or due to churn of mo-
bile sources a present gateway has to be redetected.
This is realized by a service discovery technology like
mDNS [14, 15]. After detection, a setup between the
new source and the gateway is performed: The gateway
is informed about data and computation protocols pro-
vided by the new source. This data constitutes a state
about currently obtainable insights about the environ-
ment in the form of a metadata directory. Furthermore,
the gateway establishes a control channel to the source
allowing to prepare and orchestrate SMC sessions.
The gateway specifies all aspects of an upcoming ses-
sion and communicates them to the participating sources:
The identity and the connection endpoints of coopera-
tors, the data to be used for computation and the proto-
col to be executed. The computation itself is monitored
by the gateway. On success, the gateway receives the
result. If the computation fails, the gateway tries to re-
cover or to fully restart the session. This is hidden from
any consumer in any possible cases to achieve service
character.
Data Requests and Access Control.
The purpose of the gateway towards the consumers
is to mimic a standard middleware providing data upon
request. Here, the metadata directory provides informa-
tion to the consumers what data is obtainable at this
point in time. This metadata should also abstract from
SMC specifics allowing to post requests which already
declare the aggregation result, e.g. “the average amount
of individuals in floor 3.A of the building per hour”.
Receiving these requests, the gateway then transforms
them into a corresponding SMC session and replies with
the result afterwards.
Correct representation of data requests supports ac-
cess control, transparency and intervenability essentially.
We assume requests to be authenticated and integrity
protected. The gateway is then able to perform access
control and plausbility checks when examining the pur-
pose of the request, the identity of the consumer and
the type of requested data. During SMC session setup
the gateway also transmits the original request of the
consumer to each collaborator, consequently realizing
request transparency for sources. Additional persisting
the requests provides distributed request accountabil-
ity. Lastly, this information can be evaluated by the
sources before executing the computation. Each source
can decide individually whether to contribute to the re-
quested computation or not. In case a single source
veotes against the computation, it cannot be executed;
this is handled as a special, expected error by the gate-
way and can be addressed accordingly by it. In sum-
mary, we deliberately leverage the necessity of coopera-
tion when performing computations to support the men-
tioned further privacy properties.
4. CONCLUSION
We presented a vision of privacy preserving data pro-
cessing in dynamic environments. Our design features
a management and orchestration middleware for secure
multiparty computation which allows application of SMC
as an adaptive and robust service. Furthermore, we
show how the features of SMC can be complemented
in order to fulfill further established privacy protection
goals.
We see that fundamental innovation in system archi-
tecture allows more straightforward addressing of pri-
vacy goals. While also raising new challenges to be
solved, they provide an alternative approach to estab-
lishing privacy as an afterthought in a predetermined
system.
2
5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work has been supported by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research, project DecADe,
grant 16KIS0538 and the German-French Academy for
the Industry of the Future.
6. REFERENCES
[1] M. Rost and A. Pfitzmann,
“Datenschutz-Schutzziele – revisited,”Datenschutz
und Datensicherheit DuD, vol. 33, no. 6, pp.
353–358, 2009.
[2] M. Hansen, M. Jensen, and M. Rost, “Protection
Goals for Privacy Engineering,” in 2015 IEEE
Security and Privacy Workshops, 2015, pp.
159–166.
[3] A. C. Yao, “Protocols for secure computations,” in
Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science. Washington,
DC, USA: IEEE, 1982, pp. 1–5.
[4] ——, “How to generate and exchange secrets,” in
Proceedings of the 27th IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science. IEEE
Computer Society Press, 1986, pp. 162–167.
[5] R. Cramer, I. B. Damgard, and J. B. Nielsen,
Secure Multiparty Computation and Secret
Sharing. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge
University Press, 2015.
[6] R. Canetti, “Security and Composition of
Multi-party Cryptographic Protocols,” 1999.
[7] ——, “Universally composable security: a new
paradigm for cryptographic protocols,” IEEE
International Conference on Cluster Computing,
SFCS, pp. 136–145, 2001.
[8] M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson,
“Completeness Theorems for Non-Cryptographic
Fault Tolerant Distributed Computation,”
Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM Symposium
on the Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 1–10,
1988.
[9] D. Chaum, C. Cre´peau, and I. Damg˚ard,
“Multiparty Unconditionally Secure Protocols,”
Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing, pp. 11–19, 1988.
[10] I. Damg˚ard, V. Pastro, N. Smart, and S. Zakarias,
“Multiparty computation from somewhat
homomorphic encryption,” in Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 7417, 2012, pp. 643–662.
[11] M. Keller, E. Orsini, and P. Scholl, “MASCOT,”
in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, 2016, pp. 830–842.
[12] K. Bonawitz, V. Ivanov, B. Kreuter,
A. Marcedone, H. B. McMahan, S. Patel,
D. Ramage, A. Segal, and K. Seth, “Practical
Secure Aggregation for Privacy Preserving
Machine Learning.” IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive, vol. 2017, p. 281, 2017.
[13] M. von Maltitz, S. Smarzly, H. Kinkelin, and
G. Carle, “A Management Framework for Secure
Multiparty Computation in Dynamic
Environments,” in NOMS 2018 – IEEE/IFIP
DOMINOS Workshop, Taipei, Taiwan, 2018.
[14] S. Cheshire and M. Krochmal, “Multicast DNS,”
RFC 6762 (Proposed Standard), Internet
Engineering Task Force, Feb. 2013.
[15] ——, “DNS-Based Service Discovery,”RFC 6763
(Proposed Standard), Internet Engineering Task
Force, Feb. 2013.
3
